REPORTS & STUDIES
Please see our Press release attached;
'WASHINGTON DC-AUGUST 17TH, 2020- CONSERVATIVE AND PROGRESSIVE GROUPS UNITE TO ASK GOVERNORS & ELECTIONS OFFICIALS TO ENSURE SAFE, SECURE ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER"
'Following the money' that Congress had allocated for state elections security last December ($425 million dollars), the National Election Defense Coalition (NEDC), Americans for Tax Reform, Public Citizen, Business for America, and over a dozen other state and national organizations from all sides of the political spectrum have sent ten letters calling for states to use the funds allocated by Congress for investment in cybersecurity, voter-verified paper ballots, and COVID-19 safety measures regarding voting on vulnerable voting machines. The signers were joined last Friday by eleven Republican State Representatives in Michigan. See the letters to all ten states here.
Last fall an NEDC- NBC investigation reported that nationwide there were 14,000 modems installed in voting tabulation systems in a large number of counties across the nation, and that some of the voting technology deployed by voting machine vendor ES&S contained components manufactured in China- the Chinese state is known to have demanded that Chinese factories imbed spyware chips in components shipped to US companies.
In the past week computer security researcher Kevin Skoglund reported that three key swing states which the conservative and progressive groups have targeted- Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin, all have some voting systems that are still connected to the Internet, which poses an election security risk. Other states have disconnected the systems, but might reconnect them on election night to report early results. Coalition letters have also been sent to officials in Georgia, Arizona, Tennessee, Maryland, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.
See our electiondefense.org website page which includes letters to all ten states here.
As the President, his allies on FOX, and Senate Republicans continued to undermine the Postal Service and denounce Vote by Mail, NEDC organized the letter campaign to advocate measures to fund safe in-person voting options and to prevent both infection and chaos that might be created by foreign actors on Election Day.
Each coalition letter calls on state elections officials and governors to ensure that none of their state voting and tabulation systems are connected to the Internet to protect voters and the state from hacking and foreign interference, as reported by this US Senate Intelligence Committee report. The campaign is specifically focused in some states in response to revelations that voting machine vendor ES&S had deliberately misled election officials about the connectivity vulnerability of their voting tabulators.
Immediate actions outlined in the coalition’s letters to the states in order to secure the voting process before the 2020 general election include;
Ban all voting technologies that are connected to the Internet or disconnect their modems immediately, and scan systems for viruses that may have already been inserted.
Place sufficient emergency back-up ballots for all voters in case electronic voting machines break down, or for those who don’t wish to vote on touch screen voting machines.
Print hard copy back-up of electronic poll books in all precincts.
Disinfect and limit the use of touchscreen machines to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and avoid long lines on election day.
Quotes in the press release for FL:
“Our elections should be ironclad, and we benefit from being able to double-check the results,” said Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform. “The steps outlined in this letter will help Florida shore up elections in 2020 and beyond.”
And;
“Florida should immediately investigate and disconnect any voting or tabulation technology from the Internet, to ensure elections are conducted securely,” said NEDC cyber security consultant Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (ret), president of the Conservative London Center for Policy Research and a consultant to the Pentagon. “We already know that the threat to our elections is real and foreign actors are trying to cast doubt on the integrity of November’s election. There are concrete steps states like Florida can take now to ensure voters stay safe and elections are not manipulated.”
Many thanks to Craig for his generous support of NEDC towards our bipartisan efforts to secure elections.
Ben
Email and Internet Voting: The Overlooked Threat to Election Security | National Election Defense Coalition 2018
Election Security in All 50 States | Center for American Progress, 2018
Securing Elections from Foreign Interference | Brennan Center for Justice 2019
America's Voting Machines At Risk | Brennan Center for Justice
Make Sure Every Vote Counts | Brennan Center for Justice
The Urgency of E-Voting Reform | Brennan Center for Justice
Small Vote Manipulations Can Swing Elections | Yale Study
E-Deceptive Campaign Practices Report 2010 | Electronic Privacy Information Center
Ethical Issues in E-Voting Security Analysis | Yale Law School, University of Michigan
A Deeper Look: Rebutting Shamos on E-Voting | Verified Voting
Myth Breakers: Facts About Electronic Voting Machines | Voters Unite
Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections | Voters Unite
GAO Report on Electronic Voting Machines
Original, Unaltered Election Assistance Commission "Voter Fraud" Report
Testing Election Software Effectively
The Problems with Touchscreens
Disabled Accessibility Issues
How to Hack Diebold GEMS Central Tabulator
OLDER DATA:
(Many of the following links may not be valid but the studies are available)
SCIENTIFIC STUDIES, TESTIMONY & COMMENTS ON SOFTWARE DRIVEN VOTING SYSTEMS
Consulted in Preparation of Litigation
Contemplated by Election Transparency Coalition
Also in PDF form.
Appel, Andrew (Princeton University professor, Dept. of Computer Science). How I Bought Used Voting Machines on the Internet. Princeton University, February 8, 2007.
Burstein, Aaron, and Joseph Lorenzo Hall. Public Comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Version II (first round) Submitted to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission. National Science Foundation ACCURATE (A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, and Transparent Elections), May 5, 2008.
California Secretary of State. Top to Bottom Review (TTBR) of Voting Systems. As of July 16, 2008, all 14 TTBR reports linked here. 3May2012 UPDATED link: http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-to-bottom-review.htm (from which the following reports can be found; the following links are probably also no longer valid.)
— TTBR: Bishop, Matt. Overview of Red Team Reports. University of California, Davis, n.d. (July 2007).
— TTBR: Blaze, Matt, Arel Cordero, Sophie Engle, Chris Karlof, Naveen Sastry, Micah Sherr, Till Stegers, and Ka-Ping Ye. Source Code Review of the Sequoia Voting System. University of California, Berkeley, July 20, 2007.
— TTBR: Calandrino, Joseph A., Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, David Wagner, Harlan Yu, and William P. Zeller.Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System. University of California, Berkeley, July 20, 2007.
— TTBR: Inguva, Srinivas, Eric Rescorla, Hovav Shacham, and Dan S. Wallach.Source Code Review of the Hart InterCivic Voting System. University of California, Berkeley under contract to the California Secretary of State, Top to Bottom Review, July 20, 2007.
Compuware Corp. DRE Technical Security Assessment Report for Ohio. November 2003.
Epstein, Jeremy. Improving Kentucky’s Electronic Voting System Certifications. Letter to Kentucky Attorney General Greg Stumbo. September 28, 2007.
Feldman, Ariel J., J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten. Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine. Princeton University, Center for Information Technology Policy and Dept. of Computer Science, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, September 13, 2006.
Felten, Ed. Refuting Diebold’s Response. Freedom to Tinker, September 20, 2006.
Fischer, Eric A. CRS Report for Congress: Election Reform and Electronic Voting Systems (DREs): Analysis of Security Issues. Congressional Research Service, November 4, 2003.
Florida Dept. of State: Gainey, David, Michael Gerke, and Alec Yasinsac. Software Review and Security Analysis of the Diebold Voting Machine Software Supplemental Report. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, August 10, 2007.
— Gardner, Ryan, Alec Yasinsac, Matt Bishop, Tadayoshi Kohno, Zachary Hartley, John Kerski, David Gainey, Ryan Waalega, Evan Hollander, and Michael Gerke. Software Review and Security Analysis of the Diebold Voting Machine Software. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, July 27, 2007.
— Yasinsac, Alec, Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros, Matt Bishop, David Wagner, Ted Baker, Mike Shamos, and Gary Tyson. Software Review and Security Analysis of the ES&S iVotronic 8.0.1.2 Voting Machine Firmware. Florida State University, Security and Assurance in Information Technology Laboratory, February 23, 2007.
Gonggrijp, Rop, and Willem-Jan Hengeveld. Studying the Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B Voting Computer: A Computer Security Perspective. (Marketed in the U.S. as Liberty.) Presented August 6, 2007 at the USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop, Boston, Massachusetts.
Hertzberg, Steven. DRE Analysis for May 2006 Primary Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Election Science Institute, August 2006.
Harri Hursti. Security Alert: Critical Security Issues with Diebold Optical Scan Design. Black Box Voting, July 4, 2005.
Kiayias, Aggelos, Laurent Michel, Alexander Russell, Narasimha Shashidhar, Andrew See, Alexander Shvartsman, and Seda Davtyan. Tampering with Special Purpose Trusted Computing Devices: A Case Study in Optical Scan E-Voting. University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, n.d. (2006).
Kiayias, A., L. Michel, A. Russell, and A. A. Shvartsman, with the assistance of S. Davtyan, A. See, and N. Shashidhar. Security Assessment of the Diebold TSx Voting Terminal, University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, July 16, 2007.
Kiayias, A., L. Michel, A. Russell and A. A. Shvartsman, with the assistance of M. Korman, A. See, N. Shashidhar, and D. Walluck. Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal. University of Connecticut Voting Technology Research Center, October 30, 2006.
Kohno, Tadayoshi, Adam Stubblefied, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach, Analysis of an Electronic Voting System, University of California San Diego, February 27, 2004.
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Requiring Software Independence in Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines 2007: Security and Transparency Subcommittee Recommendations for the Technical Guidelines Development Committee. November 2006.
Ohio Secretary of State. Project EVEREST (Evaluation and Validation of Election Related Equipment, Standards and Testing). As of July 16, 2008, all 13 EVEREST reports linked here.
— Press Release: Voting Systems Vulnerable. December 14, 2007.
— Project EVEREST: ES&S System Executive Summary Report. Microsolved, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
— Project EVEREST: Premier, ES&S and Hart Testing: Project Executive Summary Report. Microsolved, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
— Project EVEREST: Report of Findings: Risk Assessment Study of Ohio voting systems, Executive Report. Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, December 14, 2007.
— Project EVEREST: Risk Assessment Study of Ohio Voting Systems Executive Summary. SysTest Labs, Inc., n.d. (December 2007).
Rubin, Avi (Professor of Computer Science at Johns Hopkins University). Secretary Bowen’s Clever Insight. Avi Rubin’s Blog, August 7, 2007.
Stratford-on-Avon District Council and Warwick District Council. Electoral Pilot Scheme Evaluation. The Electoral Commission of the United Kingdom, August 2007.
United States Commission on Federal Election Reform. Building Confidence in U.S. Elections. American University and Pew Charitable Trusts, September 2005.
United States Government Accountability Office. Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, But Key Activities Need to Be Completed, September 2005.
Wagner, David, David Jefferson, Matt Bishop, Chris Karlof, and Naveen Sastry. Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter. California Voting Systems Technology Assessment Advisory Board, February 14, 2006.
— Written Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Committee on House Administration, July 19, 2006.
Wallach, Dan S. Testimony to National Institute of Standards and Technology and Election Assistance Commission Technical Guidelines Development Committee, September 20, 2004.
Wertheimer, Michael A. Trusted Agent Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System.RABA Innovative Solution Cell on behalf of Maryland General Assembly Department of Legislative Services, Annapolis, Maryland, January 2004.